Newsweek: Where Vultures Prey

October 17, 2009

Last month Dmit­ry Medvedev set out his bold new vision of a “more civ­i­lized” Rus­sia, no longer prone to the “legal nihilism” that has rot­ted the fab­ric of Russ­ian cap­i­tal­ism and turned the courts and police into tools for set­tling pri­vate busi­ness dis­putes. Many hoped that such a pow­er­ful sig­nal from the pres­i­dent would set Rus­sia on course to estab­lish the rule of law. Now, a high-pro­file test case will show who runs Rus­sia — crooks with offi­cial con­nec­tions, or the state itself. This week a crim­i­nal suit filed in a Moscow court details a scam in which senior bureau­crats, judges, and police defraud­ed the Russ­ian tax­pay­er of half a bil­lion dol­lars — and then used the courts to per­se­cute the scam’s vic­tims when they tried to blow the whistle.

Right now the nihilists appear to have the upper hand. The plain­tiff, Amer­i­can mon­ey man­ag­er Bill Brow­der, who once defend­ed Vladimir Putin for play­ing hard­ball with Rus­si­a’s busi­ness oli­garchs, now lives in Lon­don, barred from Rus­sia in 2005 as “a threat to nation­al secu­ri­ty.” His Her­mitage Fund, once the biggest for­eign investor in Rus­sia, has closed its Moscow oper­a­tions. Her­mitage’s new law­suit does not attempt to recoup the fund’s mon­ey: it charges that a shad­owy group of cor­rupt bureau­crats and police stole com­pa­nies from Brow­der and oth­ers and used them to claim fake tax rebates from the Russ­ian state. It seeks no redress for Her­mitage oth­er than the release of one of its lawyers, arrest­ed nine months ago in an appar­ent bid by crim­i­nals with police ties to silence the com­pa­ny. Yet as of last week, the alleged crooks sit in police and gov­ern­ment offices, while one of the appar­ent vic­tims is in jail and oth­er Her­mitage lawyers and man­agers have fled abroad. Since Her­mitage began com­plain­ing about the theft of its com­pa­nies, Rus­sia offi­cial­dom has done lit­tle to inves­ti­gate — but it has placed Brow­der on an inter­na­tion­al want­ed list for alleged tax irreg­u­lar­i­ties. “We’re try­ing to expose half a bil­lion dol­lars stolen by offi­cials from the gov­ern­ment,” says Brow­der. “I can­not imag­ine any oth­er coun­try which would take no action except to attack those who exposed it.”

In recent years, many big for­eign investors felt they have been harassed by ques­tion­able law-enforce­ment actions in Rus­sia. Russ­ian courts and min­istries have slapped Shell with crip­pling fines for alleged envi­ron­men­tal vio­la­tions, mys­te­ri­ous­ly revoked the work per­mits of British oil exec­u­tives from BP, dilut­ed the hold­ings of Nor­we­gian tele­com firm Telenor. The fear is that any­one who runs afoul of the state is fair game — which is one rea­son why an esti­mat­ed $7 bil­lion in for­eign cap­i­tal has left the coun­try in the sec­ond half of 2008. For­eign invest­ment is down 22.9 per­cent since last year, accord­ing to the Noviye Izves­tia news­pa­per. The Her­mitage com­plaint is the most detailed anato­my of the state of Russ­ian cor­rup­tion to appear in years. The sto­ry is so out­ra­geous — even by Russ­ian stan­dards — that a video sum­ma­ry post­ed by the plain­tiffs has become the most viewed YouTube clip in Russia.

To under­stand why this case is so impor­tant to the future of Medvede­v’s Rus­sia, we need to go into a lit­tle back­ground. Brow­der, grand­son of Earl Brow­der, one of the lead­ers of the Com­mu­nist Par­ty of Amer­i­ca, start­ed Her­mitage Fund in 1997. His strat­e­gy: buy shares in big, inef­fi­cient Russ­ian com­pa­nies like Sber­bank and Gazprom, and cam­paign for them to clean up their books and make their own­er­ship struc­ture and rev­enues more trans­par­ent. As they did so, their share prices went up.

That strat­e­gy worked well until Her­mitage began ask­ing ques­tions about the own­er­ship stake of a senior Krem­lin appa­ratchik (whom Brow­der prefers not to name) in an oil com­pa­ny in which Her­mitage was a minor­i­ty share­hold­er. With no warn­ing, in Decem­ber 2005, Brow­der found him­self on the Fed­er­al Secu­ri­ty Ser­vice visa black­list, and the Her­mitage oper­a­tion start­ed wind­ing down. Soon, vul­tures began cir­cling in the form of a group of crim­i­nals with appar­ent deep ties to the tax inspec­torate, accord­ing to court documents.

The basic idea of their scam was sim­ple: acquire com­pa­nies that had paid tax on their prof­its to the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment, then cre­ate fake loss­es, and use the adjust­ed bal­ance sheet show­ing a zero prof­it to claim the tax­es back as a rebate. “Fake tax refunds have become a pop­u­lar scam,” says Lar­isa Mave, a Moscow lawyer who has become an expert on Russ­ian cor­po­rate raids. “Obvi­ous­ly, such a crime would not be pos­si­ble with­out tax police get­ting a share.”

The scam­mers first tar­get­ed com­pa­nies set up by Renais­sance Cap­i­tal, one of Rus­si­a’s largest invest­ment hous­es, in order to buy shares in Gazprom for var­i­ous inter­na­tion­al clients. After the shares had been bought and sold and tax­es paid on the prof­its, the com­pa­nies were left emp­ty of funds. At that point, Renais­sance says, they sold off the com­pa­nies to a group of investors and heard no more about them. The pur­chasers — using a con­vict­ed mur­der­er as their front man — then faked loss­es in order to retroac­tive­ly claim back the tax mon­ey paid by Renais­sance. The only los­er, on paper, was the Russ­ian tax­pay­er. Renais­sance made no com­plaint about the fraud, say­ing that the com­pa­nies were no longer theirs and they had suf­fered no loss. Brow­der cites the silence as evi­dence that Renais­sance col­lud­ed with the fraud­sters, a claim that a Ren­cap spokesman describes as “unsub­stan­ti­at­ed alle­ga­tions based on spec­u­la­tion and hearsay.”

Next, the scam­mers set their sights on a series of invest­ment com­pa­nies cre­at­ed by Her­mitage, only these weren’t for sale. The scam­mers’ solu­tion offers a star­tling insight into the way law and order works in mod­ern Rus­sia. In June 2007, cit­ing an alleged tax vio­la­tion by Her­mitage, a group of 25 masked police raid­ed the offices of Her­mitage and of Fire­stone Dun­can, Her­mitage’s lawyers. After beat­ing up a lawyer who ques­tioned the offi­cers (he was hos­pi­tal­ized for a week), they con­fis­cat­ed two van­loads of doc­u­ments — includ­ing the found­ing char­ters of three Her­mitage-owned hold­ing com­pa­nies. While the doc­u­ments were in the pos­ses­sion of the police, new char­ters trans­fer­ring the com­pa­nies to new own­ers were drawn up, signed and cer­ti­fied, all unbe­known to Her­mitage. “No one can dis­pute that the change of own­er­ship of the com­pa­nies hap­pened while the doc­u­ments and stamps were in police cus­tody,” says Jami­son Fire­stone of Fire­stone Duncan.

The con­spir­a­tors appeared to have allies every­where in offi­cial Rus­sia. Their next move was to sue the stolen com­pa­nies in Moscow, St. Peters­burg, and Kazan for breach of var­i­ous con­tracts — also forged. Lawyers for the new own­ers plead­ed no con­test, and judges in all three cities award­ed dam­ages that amount­ed to the exact sum of the pre­vi­ous year’s prof­its. Result: the com­pa­nies now no longer showed a prof­it for the pre­vi­ous tax year, but only broke even.

The new own­ers quick­ly claimed a tax rebate total­ing $230 mil­lion, the biggest tax refund ever made in Russ­ian his­to­ry — yet was approved the day after it was filed and paid out the fol­low­ing day. Offi­cials from the tax depart­ments involved are named in Her­mitage’s law­suit as key play­ers in the fraud. So far, so neat. Her­mitage had suf­fered no loss because the hold­ing com­pa­nies had only exist­ed to trade Gazprom shares, and were emp­ty of funds by the time they were stolen. Only the Russ­ian state had lost out. But unlike Renais­sance, Her­mitage decid­ed to go pub­lic, fil­ing 35 com­plaints to Russ­ian offi­cial­dom, from the Fed­er­al Secu­ri­ty Ser­vice to the tax police.

Retal­i­a­tion came quick­ly. Clear­ly, the con­spir­a­tors had­n’t reck­oned on pub­lic­i­ty and so decid­ed to cov­er their backs. In Jan­u­ary, Sergei Mag­nit­sky, one of Fire­stone Dun­can’s top lawyers, was unex­pect­ed­ly arrest­ed as he arrived to give evi­dence to a pros­e­cu­tor assigned to inves­ti­gate the case. Impris­oned with­out bail and denied per­mis­sion to see his fam­i­ly, Mag­nit­sky told his boss, Fire­stone, that he had­n’t been seri­ous­ly ques­tioned, but instead that police and inves­ti­ga­tors had repeat­ed­ly made offers to free him if he gave evi­dence against Her­mitage. Mag­nit­sky has refused to do so. Free­ing Mag­nit­sky has become Her­mitage’s main pri­or­i­ty, which is why it’s dogged­ly inves­ti­gat­ed the scam, uncov­er­ing eight more com­pa­nies tar­get­ed and a fur­ther quar­ter-bil­lion dol­lars in stolen tax mon­ey. Her­mitage has passed its evi­dence to the Russ­ian gov­ern­men­t’s Audit Cham­ber, which has a man­date to inves­ti­gate offi­cial mal­prac­tice. “The whole sto­ry shows the lev­el of cor­rup­tion in the coun­try,” says Brow­der. “One leader — Medvedev — at least acknowl­edges the prob­lem, but he seems to be unable to do any­thing. The state is inca­pable of pro­tect­ing its own interests.”

Top Krem­lin reform­ers such as pres­i­den­tial eco­nom­ic advis­er Arkady Dvorkovich and deputy chief of the Krem­lin staff Igor Shu­val­ov are aware of the prob­lem and even sym­pa­thize with Her­mitage, says one senior West­ern diplo­mat­ic source in Moscow not autho­rized to speak on the record. But it’s clear that they lack the pow­er to act. Many Russ­ian offi­cials just shrug off the case. Gen­nady Gud­kov, a for­mer KGB colonel who heads the Duma’s Secu­ri­ty Com­mit­tee, says Brow­der should have fol­lowed Russ­ian rules — that is, by employ­ing the right secu­ri­ty com­pa­ny, known in Russ­ian as a krysha, or roof. “Brow­der was too greedy, he should have spent more mon­ey on secu­ri­ty,” says Gud­kov, who him­self runs a major pri­vate secu­ri­ty com­pa­ny. “If he dealt with us, we would have pro­tect­ed him.” Alexan­der Dubrovin­sky, a lawyer for the Arbat Pres­tige cos­met­ics retail­er whose CEO was jailed last year in a cor­po­rate raid, says, “Brow­der’s tac­tics could make sense in some oth­er coun­try — but here he had no chance of win­ning. Back in 2002 I told Mr. Brow­der that his strug­gle was hope­less.” Some col­leagues believe Brow­der court­ed dis­as­ter. “Brow­der’s style was to shout about cor­rup­tion from the rooftops; that’s a good way to get your­self into trou­ble in Rus­sia,” says one top West­ern banker in Moscow who request­ed anonymi­ty, fear­ful of dam­ag­ing his busi­ness in Rus­sia. “Most for­eign investors try to play by Russ­ian rules, which means stay­ing qui­et and shar­ing your prof­its with peo­ple who can look after you” — like top offi­cials and secret policemen.

In the end the real los­er is Rus­sia. Russ­ian stocks sell at a 40 per­cent dis­count to oth­er emerg­ing mar­kets, large­ly because of the unique­ly high risk that com­pa­nies can be stolen by well-con­nect­ed hoods. For­eign bank cred­its come at a pre­mi­um, for the same rea­son. Since 2002, Rus­sia has fall­en 30 places to num­ber 147 on Trans­paren­cy Inter­na­tion­al’s rank­ing of the world’s most cor­rupt nations, based large­ly on investor sur­veys. Rus­si­a’s own Inte­ri­or Min­istry reports that the “aver­age bribe” for a range of bureau­crat­ic ser­vices has risen 10-fold in the past decade. “Who is going to give Rus­sia mon­ey when the court sys­tem does not work, every­body ignores the law, both gov­ern­ment and soci­ety think it is OK that thou­sands of pri­vate busi­ness­es are stolen every year in Rus­sia and that raiders are paid 30 per­cent of the com­pa­nies’ assets, which comes to hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars?” says Kir­ill Kabanov, an advis­er to Medvedev and the head of the Nation­al Anti­cor­rup­tion Com­mit­tee, an NGO.

Good ques­tion. On Nov. 7 the Russ­ian gov­ern­ment will hold a road show in Lon­don, try­ing to sell $17.8 bil­lion in sov­er­eign Eurobonds to the world. Offi­cials of Medvede­v’s gov­ern­ment have fore­cast an “enor­mous appetite” for Russ­ian bonds, based on “the grad­u­al­ly improv­ing, sta­bi­liz­ing finan­cial sit­u­a­tion.” To jus­ti­fy that opti­mism, Medvedev needs to do more than crit­i­cize legal nihilism. He needs to show that his coun­try’s police and tax ser­vices aren’t run by crim­i­nals, and that his coun­try’s courts and pris­ons aren’t for sale to the high­est bid­der. If he fails, then it’s only a mat­ter of time before Rus­sia becomes too tox­ic for even the most swash­buck­ling investor. And with­out the flow of for­eign cap­i­tal, there’s next to no chance that Russ­ian busi­ness can devel­op — or for Rus­sia itself to real­ize Medvede­v’s dream of becom­ing tru­ly “civ­i­lized.”

With Anna Nemtso­va in Moscow 

Pub­lished in the Newsweek.

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